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Migrant Networks and the Spread of Information∗
August 4, 2017
Abstract
Diaspora networks provide information to future migrants, which aﬀects their success in the
host country. While the existing literature explains the eﬀect of networks on the outcomes of
migrants through the size of the migrant community, we show that the quality of the network
is an equally important determinant. We argue that networks that are more integrated in
the society of the host country can provide more accurate information to future migrants
about job prospects. In a decision model with imperfect signalling, we show that migrants
with access to a better network are more likely to make the right decision, that is, they
migrate only if they gain. We test these predictions empirically using data on recent Mexican
migrants to the United States. To instrument for the quality of networks, we exploit the
settlement of immigrants who came during the Bracero program in the 1950s. The results
are consistent with the model predictions, providing evidence that connections to a better
integrated network lead to better outcomes after migration.
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1 Introduction
Prior to moving, migrants face signiﬁcant uncertainty about their job prospects abroad, which
is why they often seek advice from existing diaspora networks. A large amount of literature
has shown that diaspora networks indeed inﬂuence the decision to migrate and aﬀect migrants'
success in the host country (Beaman, 2012; Pedersen et al., 2008; Edin et al., 2003). Throughout
this literature, the size of the network has been identiﬁed as the main determinant. In this paper,
we provide a diﬀerent perspective on the role of diaspora networks by showing that the quality
of these networks  measured by their degree of integration in the host society  has an equally
important impact on the decisions and success of future migrants.
We argue that the integration of migrant networks in the host country determines both
the decision to migrate and the outcomes after migration. Because existing networks diﬀer in
their degree of integration, some networks are able to provide more accurate information than
others concerning job prospects. Well-integrated networks that have a great deal of interaction
with the world surrounding them have better knowledge of local labor markets than enclaves,
whose members typically have little social interaction outside the network. Potential migrants
with access to a better-integrated network can base their decision on more accurate information,
which in turn makes them more likely to make a correct decision: they migrate if they can
expect to secure a job that makes them better oﬀ, whereas they stay if they can expect a job
that makes them worse oﬀ.1
To illustrate the underlying mechanism, we explore the link between information ﬂows and
the success of migrants in a simple two-period decision model. Initially, the potential migrant
has some knowledge about her expected income abroad, albeit not enough to convince her that
migration will be beneﬁcial. She then receives information from the network and updates her
beliefs about expected income from migration. To the extent that a more integrated network
provides a more truthful signal and spreads less misinformation, a migrant who receives this
information is more likely to make the right decision given her true income prospects in the
receiving country.
We test this prediction using data on recent Mexican immigrants in the US. Mexican com-
munities are spread out all across the US, allowing us to exploit a signiﬁcant degree of variation
1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms integration and assimilation interchangeably.
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in the characteristics of these communities. Communities in traditional destinations such as Los
Angeles and Houston are typically more enclaved than those in newer destinations. Key to the
empirical analysis is measuring both the quality of the network and the success of immigrants.
For the quality of the network, we compute an assimilation index that measures the degree of
similarity between Mexicans and Americans in an area with respect to a wide range of charac-
teristics. As the social networks literature has shown, people with similar characteristics have
more interaction, which leads to a more eﬃcient aggregation of information (McPherson et al.,
2001; Acemoglu et al., 2011), and ultimately to more accurate information on job prospects that
can be passed on to future migrants. To measure the success of migrants, we take the diﬀerence
between the wages of Mexicans in the US and Mexico. As the data do not allow us to observe
Mexicans in both countries at the same time, we predict counterfactual wages in Mexico based
on a large set of observable characteristics, and interpret a larger diﬀerence between income in
the US and Mexico as a lower likelihood that the migrant has made a mistake in her decision
to migrate.
Identiﬁcation is threatened by the presence of unobserved factors that may induce a spurious
relationship between the characteristics of the established network and the outcomes of newly
arrived migrants. For example, a local industry may have attracted a lot of low-skilled migrants
in the past, and does so until today, resulting in a low degree of integration of past immigrants,
low wages of current immigrants, and overall a positive correlation between both variables. To
address this endogeneity, we instrument for the integration of the network in 1990 with the
settlement of Mexican migrants who arrived during the Bracero program between 1942 and
1964. The Bracero program was a guest worker program that mainly attracted low-skilled
Mexicans who worked in agriculture and construction. Arriving initially as temporary migrants,
these workers had little incentive to integrate in American society, casting a long shadow on
the integration of Mexican communities today. Areas with a high share of Bracero immigrants
have signiﬁcantly less assimilated Mexican communities in the 1990s. At the same time, after
controlling for network size and vintage, the settlement of workers in the 1950s should aﬀect
outcomes of newly arrived migrants in 2000 only through the characteristics of the network.
The results conﬁrm the prediction of the model: migrants with access to better integrated
networks are signiﬁcantly more likely to be better-oﬀ in the US. An increase in the assimilation
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index by one standard deviation increases the monthly income diﬀerence between the US and
Mexico by 74 USD, or 16% of a standard deviation.
The previous literature has highlighted the importance of information in migration decisions.
In particular, it has been shown that migrants generally may have incorrect beliefs about their
prospective income abroad. McKenzie et al. (2013), for example, interviewed Tongan migrants
before moving to New Zealand, and ﬁnd that they signiﬁcantly under-estimate their income
in New Zealand. The discrepancy between the predicted and the realized income is mainly
explained by the negative experiences of previous migrants. On the contrary, the work of Farré
& Fasani (2013) shows that potential migrants can also over-estimate the gains from migration.
They exploit exogenous variation in the availability of TV signals in Indonesia, and show that
areas that receive more information about other regions of the country have lower emigration
rates. However, not all information ﬂows between migrant networks and their home country
are equally accurate. Batista & Narciso (forthcoming) stress the importance of the quality and
frequency of information ﬂows for the ﬂow of remittances. They use a randomized control trial
to increase the communication ﬂows between immigrants and their networks abroad, showing
that increased communication ﬂows have a positive impact on the value of remittances, due to
better control over remittance use and increased trust. Our paper contributes to the literature
on information and migration by developing a straightforward theoretical link of the quality of
information to the integration of migrant networks in the host society, and by testing how much
the integration of the networks matters for migrant outcomes after migration.
By focusing on the quality of migrant networks, this paper provides a new perspective within
the literature on network eﬀects in international migration. Generally speaking, the literature
deﬁnes a network as the number of previous migrants in a given destination and studies how
existing networks aﬀect the decisions and outcomes of future migrants. One strand of this liter-
ature documents that migration is path-dependent, with new migrants moving to places where
they ﬁnd an established community from their home countries (Pedersen et al., 2008; Beine
et al., 2010). Growing migrant communities also aﬀect the skill selection of subsequent migrants
through a reduction in moving costs, and an increase available low-skilled jobs within the com-
munity (Carrington et al., 1996; Winters et al., 2001; Munshi, 2003; McKenzie & Rapoport,
2010; Beine et al., 2015). In terms of outcomes after migration, larger migrant communities
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need not necessarily beneﬁt newly arrived migrants. As shown by Beaman (2012), existing net-
works can provide information about jobs, but once the networks become larger, there is also an
increased competition among the recipients of this information. Using data on resettled refugees
in the US, she shows that a growing network hurts the current arrival cohort, but increases
the employment and income prospects of future cohorts. Our paper introduces the quality of
the network as an additional determinant of the success of newly arrived migrants. The social
structure of migrant networks aﬀects earnings on top of the scale eﬀect found in previous papers.
Finally, the paper extends the literature concerning the impact of ethnic enclaves on the
labor market outcomes of immigrants. Borjas (1995) shows that enclaves create human capital
externalities that persist over generations. Children in ethnic enclaves grow up in a homogeneous,
`closed' environment, which often leads to a persistence in skill diﬀerentials compared to people
outside the enclave. Nonetheless, enclaves can also have a positive impact on the earnings of
newly arrived immigrants (Edin et al., 2003) as well as the likelihood of ﬁnding employment in
the destination (Andersson et al., 2009). While these papers document the impact of networks
on the outcomes of immigrants that have already emigrated, our paper shows that networks can
even have an impact on migration decisions before emigration. Not only do migrant networks
provide help in ﬁnding a job once a migrant has arrived, they also provide information to
potential migrants in their home country, thereby aﬀecting the beliefs of the potential migrant,
and ultimately her success in the receiving country.
2 Migrant Networks, Information Flows, and Migrant
Outcomes: Descriptive Evidence and Theory
We begin by presenting the core idea of the paper, namely that more integrated migrant networks
provide information of higher quality to potential migrants in their country of origin. Using data
from migrant surveys in Ireland and Germany, we provide descriptive evidence of the nature and
frequency of information ﬂows between migrant networks and their communities in the country
of origin. Finally, we formulate a decision model that explains how the information received from
the network aﬀects post-migration outcomes, and how this relationship is varies by networks of
diﬀerent degrees of integration in the host society.
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2.1 Idea: Network Integration and Information Quality
Our basic argument is that migrant communities that are more integrated in the society of
their host country are able to give better information to future migrants. Members of a more
integrated community have a better knowledge of the labor market and can give future mi-
grants more accurate information about job prospects. This argument is consistent with the
strength-of-weak-ties hypothesis (Granovetter, 1973, 2005), which states that in many situa-
tions, acquaintances  weak ties  are able to provide more important information than close
family and friends  strong ties  because any two acquaintances have fewer social ties in com-
mon and receive information from a larger number of sources outside one's own network. In
contrast, close friends and family are more likely to have the same contacts and information
sources; thus, information easily becomes redundant.
Figure 1 illustrates two examples of migrant networks with diﬀerent degrees of integration.
The ﬁgure on the left describes an ethnic enclave, whose members, represented by the circles,
have close connections within the network but very few connections to the outside world, rep-
resented by the crosses. An enclave is a typical example of a network with a high degree of
closedness. This is a pervasive pattern in social networks, which the literature often refers to
as inbreeding homophily  the fact that individuals with similar characteristics form close ties
among one another (McPherson et al., 2001; Currarini et al., 2009). The graph on the right,
in contrast, represents a well-integrated network whose members have weak connections among
each other but strong connections to the outside world.
There are at least two reasons why a potential migrant would receive better information
from a well-integrated network than from an enclave. First, the well-integrated network has
more connections to the outside world. Its members receive more information and therefore have
better knowledge about job perspectives in the receiving country. By contrast, members of an
enclave typically have little knowledge of the language of the host country (Lazear, 1999; Bauer
et al., 2005; Beckhusen et al., 2013), which makes interactions with natives diﬃcult. While
an enclave might oﬀer job opportunities within the migrant community, it has very limited
information on the labor market outside the enclave.
Second, members of the well-integrated network only have weak ties among one another;
therefore, misinformation  false beliefs about the world outside the network  is unlikely to
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Figure 1: Ethnic enclave (left) and loosely connected network (right)
Note: These two panels depict models of migrant networks. The circles represent the migrant network; the
crosses represent information sources outside the network. The network on the left is an ethnic enclave, with
strong connections within the network but weak connections to the outside world. The network on the right is
a loosely connected migrant network, with strong connections to the outside world and weak connections within
the network.
persist. The members of an enclave, on the other hand, interact mostly with other members
of the enclave; thus, each member updates her beliefs based solely on interactions with other
members. As shown in a series of theoretical papers , misinformation is more likely to persist
in such closely connected communities (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Golub & Jackson, 2010, 2012;
Bikchandani et al., 1992).
While the two network formations in Figure 1 represent polar cases that illustrate the
diﬀerences between migrant networks, in reality, most networks will lie somewhere in between.
In the theoretical analysis, we therefore introduce a parameter λ ∈ (0, 1] that describes the
ability of the network to aggregate and transmit accurate information.
2.2 Migration and information flows: suggestive evidence
A key ingredient to our theoretical reasoning is actual information ﬂows between the network and
the potential migrant before migration. While it seems natural that migrants communicate with
their contacts in the destination before their departure, only few datasets comprise information
on the frequency and intensity of these contacts.2 With respect to Mexican migration to the
2 The two notable exceptions are the IAB-SOEP Migration Sample (Brücker et al., 2014) and a survey of
immigrants in Dublin collected by Batista & Narciso (forthcoming). In particular, the survey conducted in
Ireland comprises rich information on both the immigrants' integration in Ireland and their information ﬂows
with their countries of origin. One variable that can serve as proxy for the integration of the network in the
destination is having friends among or at least regular contact with locals. Around 30% of all respondents in
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US, to the best of our knowledge, the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) is the only survey that
contains some information about interactions between Mexican migrants and potential migrants.
Although the amount of information available in the MMP on this topic is quite limited, the
evidence provided is in line with our theoretical reasoning. According to the MMP data for the
period 2000-2016, the majority of Mexican migrants (around 60%) were in contact with their
home-community members during their trip to the US. Interestingly, the proportion of migrants
in contact with their community of origin is higher during the last trip relative to their ﬁrst trip
to the US. Overall, these ﬁgures provide some suggestive evidence for the interaction between
Mexican immigrants in the US and potential migrants in Mexico as well as the likely ﬂow of
information between origin and destination communities.
Additional evidence is provided in qualitative as well as quantitative ﬁeld studies. Massey
et al. (1994), who conducted a ﬁeld study in 19 Mexican communities, stress the importance
of networks in providing information to potential migrants. In particular, the authors stress
how information about job opportunities in the US might not be available to potential migrants
living in communities with few migrants in the US. Using in-depth interviews with 138 Mexican
migrants and their families, Garip & Asad (2016) ﬁnd strong evidence for the role of networks
in the migration decision. Most interviewed migrants received information on labor market
prospects from members of their home community that had previously migrated to the US.
Most respondents report that networks helped them with information on job opportunities as
well as with the knowledge of local amenities. Based on observational data, Winters et al. (2001)
further examine the importance of networks for the decision of Mexicans to migrate to the US
as well as the level of migration. The paper explores diﬀerent types of networks  family as
well as non-family networks. The results point to an important role of both types of networks
in providing information about migration as well as help once the migrant is in the US. These
ﬁndings are in line with our own calculations from the MMP data, according to which the vast
majority of Mexican migrants (over 80%) receive support from the extended migration network
upon arrival to the US.
this survey state that they have at least one Irish friend. Comparing immigrants with and without friends
among locals, the survey data show that both groups are equally likely to provide information about the
destination to people in their home country, although immigrants with Irish friends tend to communicate
with a larger number of people in their home country.
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2.3 A Model of Migrant networks, information, and migration
decisions
To formalize the basic underlying mechanism, we consider the decision problem of a potential
migrant who has imperfect information about his expected earnings abroad. His network, that
is, people he knows in the destination, can reduce this uncertainty by providing him with more
information about earnings abroad. We model the potential migrant's decision as a Bayesian
decision problem with imperfect signaling, in which the migrant updates his prior beliefs after
receiving a signal from the network.
The network knows more about the labor market in the destination than the migrant himself,
but does not have perfect knowledge. The quality of the network, described by λ ∈ (0, 1], is
larger the more integrated a network is in the society of the destination. If a potential migrant
decides to move, he has to pay a sunk cost M > 0. We assume that a migrant is risk neutral,
and maximizes expected income. He moves as soon as the expected wage diﬀerential between at
home and abroad, w, is greater than the sunk cost. We view w as the realization of a random
variable w˜.
The migrant has a prior about his expected earnings abroad, given by
w˜ ∼ N(µ0, σ
2
0). (1)
We assume that µ0 < M , such that a priori migration is not beneﬁcial. To get better informa-
tion about expected earnings, the migrant receives a signal, θ, from the network, which has a
conditional distribution
θ|w ∼ N
(
w,
1− λ
λ
σ2
)
. (2)
If the network has perfect knowledge of the labor market, λ = 1, then the signal is perfect,
whereas if the network knows nothing about job prospects, that is, if λ → 0, then the signal is
pure noise.
After receiving the signal, the migrant updates his beliefs. Applying Bayes' rule, the poste-
rior distribution of w˜ is
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w˜|θ ∼ N(µ1(θ), σ
2
1), (3)
where
1
σ2
1
=
1
σ2
0
+
1
σ2
λ
1− λ
, and µ1(θ) = σ
2
1
(
µ0
σ2
0
+
θ
σ2
λ
1− λ
)
.
The migrant moves if µ1 > M . A migrant makes an error in his migration decision if he migrates
although it would have been beneﬁcial to stay at home. This can be the case if he received a
positive signal from his network, migrated based on the belief that he will be better oﬀ abroad,
while he learned after moving that migration was not beneﬁcial, i.e. w < M .
The probability of making an ex-post error in the migration decision can be expressed as a
function of the signal, which is in turn a function of the network quality λ,
α(θ) = P (w˜ < M |θ) = Φ
(
M − µ1(θ)
σ1
)
. (4)
Figure 2 provides a numerical example that illustrates the negative relationship between the
network quality and the probability of making an error in the migration decision.3
3 Data and Measurement
The theory predicts a reduced-form relationship between the integration of migrant networks and
the likelihood that migrants make a mistake in their decision to migrate. The more integrated
the network is in the host country, the more likely it is that a migrant has ex post a higher
income than in the home country, and the less likely it is that he made an error in his decision
to migrate.
3.1 Mexican Migration to the US
To test this relationship empirically, we use data on Mexican immigrants in the US. According
to the American Community Survey, in 2011, there are over 33 million Hispanics in the US
with Mexican origins, of which over 11 million were born in Mexico. Until today, there are
3 This error is analogous to a type-I-error. The potential migrant tests the hypothesis that his income is
higher in the US than at home, based on the observation of the signal.
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Figure 2: Network quality and the likelihood of taking a wrong decision
Note: Numerical example based on M = 0.8, σ0 = σ = 1, θ = 0.5.
signiﬁcant migration ﬂows to the US. Between 2005 and 2010, for example, an estimated 1.1%
of the Mexican population migrated internationally, mostly to the US.4
Focusing on Mexicans allows us to exploit a signiﬁcant degree of variation in the charac-
teristics of Mexican communities across the entire country. Mexicans have had a long tradition
of emigration to the US, leading to well-established Mexican communities in many US cities.
However, the settlement pattern changed in the 1990s. While until the 1980s most Mexicans
went to California, Texas, and Chicago, many Mexicans in the 1990s settled in areas that had
no signiﬁcant pre-existing Mexican community, such as Atlanta, Denver, Raleigh-Durham, Seat-
tle, or Washington, D.C. (Card & Lewis, 2007). This gradual diﬀusion of Mexicans across the
US led to a great deal of heterogeneity across Mexican communities, both in terms of size and
integration. Another advantage of looking at one nationality is that it reduces unobserved het-
erogeneity because the network characteristics and the success of migrants diﬀer less within a
nationality than between diﬀerent nationalities.
3.2 Main dataset
The core dataset is the 2000 US census, supplemented with information from the 1990 US census
and the 2000 Mexican census. We use the 5%-sample of the US census, and the 10%-sample
4 Source: Census of Population and Housing 2010 (Censo de Poblacion y Vivienida).
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of the Mexican census provided by IPUMS.5 The US census is representative at the individual
and household level, and includes both legal and illegal migrants, but without containing an
identiﬁer for illegal migrant status.6
Our sample consists of Mexican immigrant men who arrived in the US between 1995 and
2000. We deﬁne immigrants as Mexican citizens who were born in Mexico and report in the
census that they were residing in Mexico 5 years ago. The sample is restricted to Mexicans aged
18-64 who were at least 18 years old when they moved to the US and who moved to a district
with at least 20 Mexicans.7 An outline of further restrictions to the sample can be found in
Appendix B.2.
The restriction of the sample to recent migrants is the result of a trade-oﬀ between having
a measure of lifetime success on the one hand, and accurate information on the network, as well
as a less selective sample on the other. The gold standard for measuring the success of migrants
would be to compare their lifetime earnings in the US with counterfactual lifetime earnings in
Mexico. Unfortunately, detailed data on the entire earnings history of migrants is not available.
If we used information from a single census round on migrants who have been in the US for a long
time, we would not be able to reconstruct a migrant's network at the time of arrival. Moreover,
as shown by Biavaschi (2016) and Campos-Vazquez & Lara (2012), selective out-migration of
more successful migrants would lead to an under-estimation of the success of migrants. With the
focus on recent migrants, we can only measure their short-term success, although this enables
us to obtain a more precise measure of their network, and base the estimation on a less selective
sample.
For our analysis, the census oﬀers two advantages. First, it is the only dataset that is large
enough to cover Mexican communities across the whole of the US, allowing us to exploit a large
degree of variation in terms of network quality, size, and vintage across the US within one nation-
ality. Second, the census contains rich information on individual and household characteristics,
such as the age at the time of immigration, birth place, current employment, education and
5 Ipums: Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B. Schroeder, and
Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
6 Moreover, the census only includes people who reside in the US; it thus does not include people who visit
the US on a tourist visa or any other short-term visitors (Hanson, 2006).
7 As districts, we use CONSPUMAs (consistent public use microdata area). A cutoﬀ of 20 is necessary for our
measure of integration. As this measure is based on a probit model at the CONSPUMA-level, a minimum
number of observations is required for convergence.
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family situation.
Besides these advantages, the US census has two limitations: it has no direct information
on the network of the migrant or the information ﬂows between the network and the migrant
prior to migration.8 A further limitation is that it contains no information on wages prior to
migration, which would be helpful to compare the migrants' situation in Mexico and the US.
Recently available longitudinal datasets, such as ENET or the Mexican Family and Life Survey,
contain this information, but they have limited information on outcomes after migration.9
A further concern with data on Mexicans in the US is the undercounting of illegal migrants.
The majority of Mexicans in the United States arrive as illegal immigrants and only receive their
residence permit at a later stage (Massey & Malone, 2002; Hanson, 2006). While the census
does not ask respondents about their legal status, some illegal migrants might fear negative
consequences and choose not to take part in the survey or might not be available for some
other reason. The undercounting of illegal migrants can lead to selection bias if the least-skilled
migrants are more likely to be excluded. While we are aware that undercounting might bias the
results, it is important to note that the extent of undercounting has decreased signiﬁcantly over
the last census rounds: from a 40% undercount rate in 1980 (Borjas et al., 1991) and 15-20% in
the 1990s (Bean et al., 2001; Costanzo et al., 2002) to around 10% in the 2000 survey (Card &
Lewis, 2007). Moreover, Chiquiar & Hanson (2005) show that undercounting only causes minor
changes to the wage distribution of Mexicans in the US, which means that there is no systematic
undercount of a particular skill level.
3.3 Measuring the Success of Migrants
Next, we turn to the construction of the dependent variable. To be in line with the theory,
we require a measure for an error in the migration decision  that is, a variable that indicates
whether a Mexican in the US would have been better oﬀ staying in Mexico rather than incurring
the ﬁxed moving cost and earning an income in the US. The error in a migration decision could
then be measured by a binary variable that takes value one if the earnings in Mexico are larger
8 While other datasets, such as the Mexican Migration Project, contain some information on the assistance
of friends and family members in the migration decision, they do not contain information on the broader
network that goes beyond family and friends, and they have limited variation in networks across destinations
in the US.
9 See Appendix A for a discussion of other datasets on Mexicans in the US.
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than the earnings in the US minus moving costs. Given that we cannot observe moving costs,
it is diﬃcult to construct this measure without introducing a great deal of measurement error.
To proxy for the success or failure of migrants, we use the diﬀerence between wages in the
US and Mexico. The larger the value of this diﬀerence, the higher the wage in the US relative to
Mexico, and the less likely it is that an immigrant has made an error in her decision to migrate.
We calculate the wage diﬀerence as the diﬀerence between the actual monthly wage in the US,
and a counterfactual wage of workers in Mexico with the same observable characteristics. Wages
from both countries are taken from the US and Mexican censuses. Wages are self-reported. As
Mexicans in the US and Mexico might diﬀer with respect to the number of working hours, we
adjust wages by the number of working hours in a typical work week and the number of weeks
worked in a typical year. In addition, we convert Mexican wages into US dollars and account for
diﬀerences in price levels using a PPP factor.10 Initially, we only include workers with a positive
income in the wage regressions. In Appendix F, we test the robustness of the wage predictions
using a two-step selection model on the full sample.
3.3.1 Counterfactual wages
To predict the counterfactual wages, we ﬁrst use the 2000 Mexican census and regress monthly
log wages on a vector of personal characteristics
log(wage) =XMEXβMEX + ε, (5)
from which we obtain an estimate for skill prices in Mexico, βˆMEX . The vectorXMEX includes
a set of education dummies, age, and age squared, as well as interactions of the education
dummies with age and age squared. Unobservable determinants of log wages are determined by
the i.i.d error term ε. The functional form  log wages regressed on education, age and other
observable characteristics  represents a Mincer earnings function, although the interaction
terms allow us to have a separate age-earnings gradient for each education level. Compared to a
regression with wages in levels as dependent variable, the log transformation of wages typically
ensure a better model ﬁt. Moreover, the Mincer equation is ﬁrmly grounded in a theory of
human capital investment (Mincer, 1974).
10 See Appendix B for a description of the samples and the wage adjustment.
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Contrary to what is done in large parts of the literature, the goal of estimating Equation
(5) is not to obtain causal estimates for one or more parameters, but to obtain a prediction
of a person's expected earnings given that person's observable characteristics. Nonetheless, it
is important to assume that the error term is i.i.d (independently and identically distributed).
Otherwise we would systematically over- or under-predict a person's wage. As argued by Po-
lachek (2008), a crucial assumption of earnings functions is that the age-earnings proﬁle is
constant across education groups, which is often not the case and would potentially violate the
i.i.d assumption. To alleviate this concern, and to improve the ﬁt of the regression model, we
include interaction terms of the education dummies with age and age squared.11 The regressors
included in the model explain 30.8% of the total variation in log wages. The goodness of ﬁt
could be improved by adding regressors with additional predictive power, although our choice
of regressors is constrained by the joint availability in the US and Mexican censuses.
Using the same characteristics for Mexicans in the US, XUS , we then predict the counter-
factual wages as
̂log(wage) =XUSβˆMEX . (6)
In some speciﬁcations, we will use wages in levels rather than logs, which we obtain by taking
the exponential of the predicted log wage, ŵage = exp(XUSβˆMEX). To make both wages
comparable, we convert the counterfactual wages into US dollars and adjust for diﬀerences in
price levels using PPP data from the Penn World Tables.12
The diﬀerence between the actual and the counterfactual wage yields the gains from emi-
gration. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the gains for Mexicans with a positive wage income
in the US. As can be seen, most Mexican workers in the US are ﬁnancially better oﬀ than in
Mexico. The average Mexican in 2000, conditional on working, earns around 700 USD per month
more in the US. Around 5% of the distribution would be better oﬀ in Mexico, while around 25%
have a wage diﬀerence between zero and 500 USD per month.13
11 To graphically assess the validity of the i.i.d assumption, we plotted the residuals from the wage regressions,
which display a symmetric distribution centered at zero. See Appendix C.
12 The PPP conversion implicitly assumes that migrants consume their entire income in the US.
13 Whether workers with, say, a 200 USD diﬀerence are indeed better oﬀ in monetary terms depends on the
moving costs and a person's discount rate. For a given discount rate, the longer it takes a person to recover
the moving costs, the worse.
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Figure 3: Gains from emigration
Note: The graph shows the distribution of the gains from emigration in 2000, which is measured as the diﬀerence
between the actual and counterfactual monthly income. The graphs only include workers with a positive income
in the US.
3.3.2 Counterfactual wages and self-selection
The prediction of counterfactual wages in Equation (6) assigns to every Mexican in the US the
average wage of a worker in Mexico with the same observable characteristics. But this measure
could be biased if migrants and non-migrants diﬀer with respect to unobservable characteristics,
which is very likely given that education, age, gender and marital status only represent some
of the factors that determine wages. Unobserved factors such as IQ, conﬁdence, motivation or
self-selection into a certain type of ﬁrm or industry potentially have a large impact on wages
and can explain wage diﬀerentials between workers with identical observable characteristics.
The literature provides ample evidence that emigrants from Mexico are not a random sample
of the entire Mexican population. While the earlier literature based its analysis on observable
characteristics and found that Mexican emigrants were mainly selected from the center of the
Mexican income distribution (Chiquiar & Hanson, 2005; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2005), more recent
studies have shown that Mexican emigrants are negatively selected on unobservable character-
istics. Using longitudinal data that tracks Mexican workers across the border, Ibarraran &
Lubotsky (2007), Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2011), and Ambrosini & Peri (2012), ﬁnd that
pre-migration earnings were on average lower for emigrants than for stayers.
Due to negative self-selection, the counterfactual wages are upward-biased because we assign
to every Mexican emigrant a higher income than he would actually have. Consequently, the
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dependent variable  the diﬀerence between the US wage and the counterfactual wage 
is downward-biased. While our cross-sectional data does not allow us to directly analyze the
magnitude of the selection bias, we can get an idea of its importance by using diﬀerent samples to
predict the counterfactual wages. If we cannot directly observe counterfactual wages, the second
best way is to predict them based on Mexicans who are as similar as possible to Mexicans in the
US. Two obvious candidates are internal migrants and return migrants, because both groups are
by deﬁnition more mobile than never-migrants, and should be more comparable to migrants to
the US. To be sure, the diﬀerent migration decisions  migration to the US, return to Mexico,
migration within Mexico  may be driven by diﬀerent selection patterns (Borjas, 1987; Borjas
& Bratsberg, 1996; Bartolucci et al., 2013). However, as we show in Appendix F, the predicted
Mexican wages are similar regardless of the method, suggesting that selection bias is negligible.
The wage diﬀerence between Mexico and the US measures the success of migrants based on
their economic situation in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after migration. While we believe that it represents
a suitable measure, it should be noted that wage diﬀerences might not be the only indicator
for the success of migrants, with local amenities, available housing and other location-speciﬁc
factors possibly contributing to the utility of a destination. If migrants maximize utility rather
than income in their location choice, then we should not be surprised if a considerable share
has wage diﬀerentials close to zero. While non-monetary factors might play a role in location
choice, recent literature has shown that a model of income maximization can explain most of
the variation in location choices of both internal and international migrants (Kennan & Walker,
2011; Grogger & Hanson, 2011).
3.4 Measuring the Integration of Migrant Communities
A further key ingredient to the empirical analysis is the integration of migrant communities. As
outlined in Section 2.1, there are good reasons to believe that better integrated networks have
better knowledge about the labor markets in a given area because they have more interaction
with the world outside the network. Thus, incorrect beliefs would not easily spread in such a
community. As it is most likely that migrants received some information from the network they
eventually moved to, we measure the network variable for each migrant using characteristics of
Mexicans that already lived in the same local area in the US.
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The question is how to measure whether a migrant community is well-integrated in the area.
The literature on social networks suggests statistics that measure the degree of homophily 
the likelihood that a person only interacts with people of the same group (McPherson et al.,
2001). An enclave would have a high degree of homophily, as its members interact mostly with
each other but not with people outside the enclave. A direct measure of homophily requires very
detailed data on the connections within a community.
Given that we cannot measure direct links between members of Mexican communities, we
proxy the network quality with an assimilation index that measures the similarity between
Mexicans and Americans in a given area with respect to a large set of observable characteristics.
If Mexicans and Americans are similar with respect to variables such as age, education, fertility,
occupation, and home ownership, they most likely have more interaction with Americans, and
hence the network is well-integrated and has access to more accurate knowledge about the labor
market. On the contrary, if Mexicans and Americans in an area are very diﬀerent in their
characteristics, there is probably little interaction between the two groups.14
We calculate the assimilation index at the smallest geographic unit that is consistently
available across multiple rounds of the US census, namely the so-called CONSPUMA . In each
round, the Census Bureau deﬁnes PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Area), small geographic units
with a population between 100,000 and 200,000 people. PUMAs do not cross state borders
and their boundaries are re-drawn with every census so that the size of each PUMA never
exceeds 200,000 people. The deﬁnition of PUMAs changes with every census round. To make
PUMAs comparable over time, the US Census Bureau has introduced CONSPUMAs that have
the same boundaries from 1980 to 2010 and are larger than the original PUMAs.15 As we want
to calculate the assimilation index of the communities before the most recent migrants arrived,
we use CONSPUMAs. To every migrant who moved to a given CONSPUMA between 1995 and
2000, we assign the assimilation index of Mexicans that lived in the same area in 1990.
14 It is important to note here that we use assimilation as a statistical concept rather than a sociological one.
According to the sociological deﬁnition, a person is assimilated if he/she has given up his cultural identity,
as opposed to integration, which is deﬁned as showing commitment to the host society while maintaining
one's cultural identity (Harles, 1997). A further deﬁnition of assimilation that has been used in economics is
wages (Chiswick, 1978; Borjas, 1985). In contrast, we use a statistical deﬁnition, whereby we see migrants
as assimilated if we cannot statistically distinguish them from natives based on a large array of observable
characteristics. This means that our measure is broader than assimilation based on wages.
15 According to the Census Bureau, PUMAs cannot be matched across census rounds. The size of CON-
SPUMAs ranges between 100,000 and 4.3 million inhabitants.
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Following Vigdor (2008), we calculate the assimilation index as a statistical measure of
similarity between Mexicans and Americans in an area. The assimilation index is low if we
randomly draw people from a given area, and their observable characteristics clearly identify
them as Mexicans or Americans. On the contrary, if we cannot tell both groups apart based on
observable characteristics, Mexicans and Americans are very similar, which is reﬂected in a high
assimilation index.
We proceed in three steps. First, we use all Mexicans and Americans  both men and
women  in the sample and run in each metropolitan area a separate probit regression of a
binary variable (1 if Mexican, 0 if US citizen) on a large set of observable characteristics. We
then restrict the sample to all Mexicans in the area, and use the probit estimates to predict
the probability of being Mexican based on their observable characteristics. A failure to predict
that someone with given characteristics is Mexican means that the person is very similar to US
natives in the same area. Finally, we use the predicted probabilities of all Mexicans in an area
to compute the assimilation index for each CONSPUMA.
We ﬁrst run the following probit regression:
P (Mexican |X) = Φ(Z) = Φ(Xβ), (7)
where Φ() is the cumulative density function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. X
contains the following variables: marital status, gender, education (4 categories, see Appendix
B.1), employment status, number of children, age, and home ownership. We also include the
median income of the person's occupation in 1990 (variable ERSCOR90) to see whether migrants
work in similar occupations compared to Americans. The sample for the calculation of the
assimilation index is more restrictive than the sample used in the regressions in the next section.
It consists of all Mexicans between 25 and 64 years who live in a metropolitan area with at least
20 Mexicans. To increase statistical power, we estimate Equation (7) at the level of metropolitan
area, and use the estimates to compute a separate assimilation index for each CONSPUMA.16
We then restrict the sample to Mexicans only, and pretend for the moment that we do not
16 To calculate the assimilation index, we need to run a separate probit regression in each local area. We
choose metropolitan areas as geographic units here, because each metropolitan area has enough Mexicans
for the estimator to converge. In small CONSPUMAs, especially in areas with a low share of immigrants, the
number of Mexicans is not suﬃcient for the estimator to converge. However, the analysis yields a separate
prediction for every person, which we then aggregate at the CONSPUMA level.
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know if a person is Mexican or American. Using the estimated coeﬃcients βˆ, we predict for
every person i in the sample the probability that the person actually is a Mexican.
pˆi = Φ(Zˆ) = Φ(Xβˆ), (8)
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the joint normal distribution. The higher
this probability, the more diﬀerent is the person from the US citizens living around her. If
the observable characteristics perfectly predict that a person is Mexican, then this implies that
the person has a low degree of assimilation in her local area, whereas if the person was highly
assimilated, we would not be able to statistically distinguish her from an American.
To obtain the assimilation index for an entire Mexican community in a CONSPUMA, we
take the average predicted probability for each CONSPUMA, p̂m, and calculate the estimate of
the assimilation index as
̂indexm = 100(1− p̂m). (9)
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the assimilation index in 1990. The density was calculated
based on CONSPUMA-level data weighted by the number of Mexicans in a CONSPUMA such
that each bar reﬂects the number of Mexicans living in an area with a given assimilation index.
As the ﬁgure shows, there is considerable heterogeneity in the degree of assimilation across
CONSPUMAs. The largest number of Mexicans live in areas with an assimilation index between
40 and 80. Networks with assimilation indices above 80 are mostly small, although there are
also a number of smaller networks that have an assimilation index lower than 80.
The assimilation index is based on personal characteristics as well as variables related to
economic well-being, such as wages, employment, or the earnings score. In the empirical analysis
to follow, it is important to show that the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of several
variables. In addition to the baseline results, we present estimations with an assimilation index
that includes self-reported language skills  a direct measure of assimilation. We also present
results for an index that only includes personal characteristics.
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Figure 4: Assimilation index in 1990
Note: The graph shows the distribution of the assimilation index in 1990. It is based on CONSPUMA-level data,
weighted by the number of Mexicans per CONSPUMA.
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the main variables
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
A. Aggregate data
Monthly income (USD) 202 1224.29 528.70 395 4417
Income diﬀerence US-Mexico 202 890.32 476.31 67 3558
Assimilation in 1990 202 85.99 14.10 44 100
Share of Braceros (in %) 202 0.22 0.45 0 4
Share of Mexicans (in %) 202 4.50 6.57 0 35
Nr of Mexicans (in 1000) 202 20.95 56.39 0 555
Mean wage of US natives (monthly) 202 2493.44 504.30 1477 3906
B. Individual-level data
Monthly income (USD) 20131 1121.30 1168.79 0 14614
Income diﬀerence US-Mexico 20131 810.29 1152.19 -937 13798
Age 20131 28.62 8.72 18 64
Age at immigration 20131 26.66 8.70 18 64
Assimilation index 20131 76.06 13.05 44 100
Married 20131 0.48 0.50 0 1
High-school dropout 20131 0.14 0.35 0 1
Lower secondary school 20131 0.49 0.50 0 1
Upper secondary school 20131 0.33 0.47 0 1
College Degree 20131 0.04 0.21 0 1
Notes: Aggregate statistics are computed at the CONSPUMA-level, conditional on at least one Mexican living in the area.
The share of Braceros is the share of Mexicans in the population of a CONSPUMA that immigrated between 1942 and
1964, during the time of the Bracero guest worker program. Individual-level data as well as the income diﬀerence in Panel
A is based on men only.
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the US census in 2000. Panel A shows the aggregate
statistics at the CONSPUMA-level, while panel B shows the individual-level statistics of the
sample. In the regressions to follow, we will use both aggregate and individual data.
The aggregate variables in Panel A are computed conditional on at least one Mexican living
there. The distribution of Mexicans across the US is heavily skewed, with a large number of
small communities and a small number of large communities. The median share of Mexicans in
a CONSPUMA is 0.9% and the median number is 1,700, while the largest number of Mexicans
in a CONSPUMA is more than 500,000 (a CONSPUMA within Los Angeles). The area with
the largest concentration has 35% Mexicans (McAllen-Edinburg-Pharr-Mission, TX).17
Panel B displays the characteristics of immigrants who recently arrived in the US. Most
immigrants come to the US in their early 20s. The vast majority has a lower secondary ed-
ucation or less, while there are very few Mexicans immigrants with a college education. The
median Mexican moved to a community with an assimilation index of 70. For most immigrants,
migration pays oﬀ, with Mexicans in the US earning on average around 800 USD more than
they would earn in Mexico  although there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the income
diﬀerence.
4 Identification and Estimation Strategy
To estimate the eﬀect of network quality on the success of migrants, we ﬁt the following regres-
sion:
y2000ij = α+ β assim
1990
j +R
′
jγ +X
′
ijδ + εij , (10)
in which the dependent variable yij is a measure for the success of migrant i in CONSPUMA
j. To align the empirical analysis with the theoretical model, in our baseline regressions, the
dependent variable is the wage diﬀerence between the monthly wage in the US and the predicted
counterfactual wage in Mexico in USD. We will also report regression results with US wages in
17 The mean assimilation index diﬀers between Table 1 and Figure 4, because in the former, every Mexican
community receives equal weight, while in the latter, observations are weighted by the number of Mexicans
in the community.
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levels and logs as dependent variable.
The regressor of interest is the assimilation index for all Mexicans that lived in CONSPUMA
j in 1990, assim1990j . Given the diﬀerences in the characteristics of CONSPUMAs with respect
to economic performance and the size of the existing Mexican community, we control for a
vector of CONSPUMA characteristics, Rj , which includes the average income of US natives, as
well as a polynomial in the number of Mexicans that have lived in the CONSPUMA in 1995.
Moreover, to make Mexican immigrants comparable across the US, we control for a vector of
observable characteristics, Xij , which includes dummies for four education levels (high school
dropouts, high school degree, some college, completed college), a dummy for being married, and
a quadratic in age. Finally, εij is an error term that captures all other factors that determine
the wage diﬀerence but are not controlled for in the regression.
4.1 Inference
Statistical inference is challenging due to three factors. First, in some regressions, the depen-
dent variable varies at the individual level whereas the regressor is a group variable and only
varies across CONSPUMAs, which means that the error terms are potentially correlated within
CONSPUMAs. Second, the assimilation index is a generated regressor, i.e. the result of a pre-
diction, which potentially leads to an underestimate of the standard errors. Finally, in some
speciﬁcations the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the actual wage in the US and a
predicted counterfactual wage in Mexico. Therefore, one component of the dependent variable is
predicted, which may introduce heteroskedasticity and potentially inﬂates the variance. In light
of these issues, reliable inference can only be drawn if standard errors are adjusted appropriately.
Our solution simultaneously solves the ﬁrst two problems, namely clustering and generated
regressors. In all unweighted regressions  which are the source of most results reported in
this paper  we compute bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replication. In regressions
where an individual-level variable is regressed on a group variable, we use a block bootstrap
whereby a block equals a CONSPUMA. While, in general, bootstrapped standard errors are
immune to the bias resulting from including a generated regressor, bootstrapping at the block
level accounts for the within-CONSPUMA correlation of the error term, thus eliminating the
clustering problem (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2006). To remedy the third problem, one solution
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would be to report heteroskedasticity-robust or clustered standard errors.18 However, these do
not adjust for the bias from generated regressors. To assess the robustness of our inference in
the presence of a generated dependent variable, we will perform a robustness check whereby the
dependent variable is the US wage alone.
4.2 Instrumental Variable Strategy
To estimate the causal eﬀect of network quality on the success of migrants, one would ideally want
to randomly assign new immigrants to diﬀerent types of networks and observe the diﬀerences in
the outcome of interest after they have migrated. Given that such an experiment is not available
for Mexicans in the US, an alternative approach would be to ﬁnd exogenous variation in the
quality of networks that is unrelated to other factors that might aﬀect the outcome of interest.
In the absence of a clean quasi-experiment  for example, a change in migration policies that
aﬀects one group of migrants but not another  we rely on instrumental variables that aﬀect the
assimilation of local Mexican communities but have no direct eﬀect on the success of migrants.
The assimilation index is potentially endogenous in this regression, in which case the estimate
for β could not be interpreted as a causal eﬀect. Endogeneity could arise because migrants
self-select into areas based on local amenities, such as existing migrant networks, employment
opportunities or public services. This concern is particularly important in our estimation of
Equation (10) which regresses the success of current migrants on the assimilation of previous
migrants, which in turn could be seen as a proxy for the success of previous migrants. If current
migrants with a higher earnings potential move to areas with a high degree of assimilation, we
would observe a positive correlation, which would be spurious and purely due to the self-selection
of immigrants into areas. The control variables in Equation (10), which include a person's
education level and age, only capture the observable component of a person's earnings potential,
whereas the selection can also be based on unobservable characteristics such as motivation,
language skills, or the ability to adapt to a new environment.
18 Lewis & Linzer (2005) show that generated dependent variables lead to heteroskedasticity. Cameron &
Miller (2015) explain why clustered standard errors account for heterogeneity.
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4.2.1 The Bracero Progam
To address the endogeneity problem, we use the settlement of Mexicans in the US during the
Bracero program as an instrumental variable. The Bracero Program was a temporary migra-
tion program that allowed Mexicans to take up temporary agricultural work in the US. The
program was initially introduced as a wartime measure to compensate for the labor shortage in
agriculture, and it was subsequently expanded and extended by Congress. Over the duration
of the program, from 1942 to 1964, around 4.6 million Mexican workers temporarily moved to
the US,19 mainly to work in agriculture. The number of Mexican migrants entering to the US
under the Bracero program steadily increased since 1942 until its peak in 1959 with 437,643 new
admissions (Calavita, 1992). The number of new admissions subsequently declined until the
end of the program in 1964 (McElroy & Gavett, 1965). The recruitment process involved four
parties. Federal oﬃcials informed Mexican authorities about the amount of labour requested
by American agricultural businesses. Mexican authorities then selected suitable candidates be-
fore the ﬁnal assessment was performed in the United States. Applicants that were suited for
the job were temporarily employed before being repatriated. Although during the initial phase
guest-workers hailed from, and were recruited in, Mexico City, American labor demand had
increasingly been satisﬁed by individuals coming from rural areas, who were arguably more ac-
customed to agricultural occupations. Further recruitment centers were opened in cities closer
to the border, such as Chihuahua, Hermosillo, and Monterrey.
As shown by Massey & Liang (1989), many of these workers took repeated trips to the
US before eventually settling there. Most Bracero workers were low-skilled, and the tempo-
rary nature of the program gave them little incentive to integrate into US society after arrival.
The low degree of integration of the Braceros seemingly helped create more closed-up Mexican
communities, resulting in a low degree of assimilation of Mexicans living in the same places in
1990.
Figure 5 displays the ﬁrst-stage relationship between the share of Braceros and the assim-
ilation in 1990, controlling for CONSPUMA and individual characteristics.20 Clearly, a higher
19 Most sources report estimates of the total number: the Bracero History Archive reports 4.6 million
(www.braceroarchive.org/about, accessed on July 4, 2017), Massey & Liang (1989) 4.5 million.
20 We compute the number of Bracero migrants in a CONSPUMA from the 2000 census based on the number
of hispanic Mexican-born immigrants who immigrated between 1942 and 1964.
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share of Bracero immigrants predicts a low level of assimilation. Whether this relationship is
strong enough to eliminate weak instrument bias will depend on the speciﬁcation. The con-
ventional threshold for instruments not to be considered weak is an F-Statistic of the excluded
instrument of F > 10 (Stock et al., 2002). As shown by Bound et al. (1995) and Staiger & Stock
(1997), weak instruments can introduce two biases into an estimate. First, in ﬁnite samples,
weak instruments lead to a small sample bias that goes in the same direction as the OLS estimate
that includes the endogenous regressor. Second, a small violation of the exclusion restriction can
be severely inﬂated, introducing a bias of unknown sign. In addition, with weak instruments,
the two-stage-least-squares estimator can understate the standard errors in the second-stage,
leading to an under-rejection of the null hypothesis of no eﬀect (Moreira, 2003).21
Figure 5: First stage relationship
Note: This graph displays a bin scatter of the ﬁrst-stage relationship between the share of Bracero immigrants
in a CONSPUMA, and the assimilation index in 1990. The dashed line shows the coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst stage
regression of the assimilation index on the share of Braceros, individual control variables, as well as controls for
average US wages, and a fourth-order polynomial in the number of Mexicans in a CONSPUMA.
4.2.2 Instrument validity
The identifying assumption behind this instrument is that the share of Bracero immigrants
aﬀects the success of current migrants only through the assimilation of the network. We believe
that this assumption holds because the share of Braceros is very small compared to the total
population in a CONSPUMA. As shown in Table 1, the share of Braceros in the total population
21 We assess the severity of these issues for our estimations in Appendix E.
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of a CONSPUMA is 0.22%. Therefore, it is unlikely that the average share of Braceros had an
eﬀect on the broader economy of an area, and that this eﬀect would be noticeable almost 40
years later.
One potential violation of the exclusion restriction, however, is the impact of Braceros on
the size of the network, which in turn may aﬀect both the assimilation of a community and
the wages of recent immigrants. As shown by Beaman (2012), the size of the network directly
aﬀects the performance of immigrants, positively through a higher number of jobs within the
network, and negatively through greater competition for these jobs. In order to control for this
potential transmission channel, we include a polynomial of the network size in the regression. In
robustness checks, we will also control for several characteristics of the Mexican communities,
such as average education and the employment rate.
5 Results
5.1 Results at the aggregate level
We ﬁrst explore the relationship between network quality and the success of migrants at the
CONSPUMA-level. Panel A in Table 2 displays the results for the following estimating equation
y2000j = α+ β assim
1990
j +R
′
jγ + εj , (11)
whereRj includes the average wage of US natives in 2000 in all speciﬁcations, and a fourth-order
polynomial in the number of Mexicans in some.22 Standard errors in all columns except (2) and
(5) have been computed using a bootstrap with 1000 replications. For the weighted regressions
in Columns (2) and (5), we report heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
Column (1) displays the OLS estimate for β in Equation (11). The partial correlation is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. An increase in the assimilation index by
one point increases the monthly wage diﬀerence between US and Mexican wages by 5.8 USD.
This may not sound like a large eﬀect; but increasing the assimilation index by one standard
deviation (SD=14), increases the wage diﬀerence by 81.2 USD per month, or 17.5% of a standard
22 Controlling for a higher-order polynomial in the size of the community within a CONSPUMA allows us to
account for the uneven size distribution of Mexican communities. We assess the robustness of the estimates
to the functional form in Section 5.3.
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Table 2: Network assimilation and the success of recent migrants
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 5.815∗∗∗ 6.734∗∗∗ 4.868∗∗∗ 6.286∗∗∗ 6.893 3.555
(1.547) (0.980) (1.704) (2.362) (4.208) (50.708)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -16.110∗∗∗ -7.835∗∗∗ -2.536
(4.037) (2.890) (2.466)
F-Statistic 12.53 7.35 2.49
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 5.033∗∗∗ 6.626∗∗∗ 6.204∗∗∗ 5.057∗∗∗ 9.082∗∗∗ 8.846∗∗∗
(0.895) (1.351) (1.211) (1.145) (3.378) (2.993)
First stage:
Share Braceros -14.804∗∗∗ -14.643∗∗∗ -7.742∗∗ -7.683∗∗
(5.402) (5.506) (3.577) (3.607)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 13.94 12.84 6.59 6.08
N 20131 20131 15082 20131 20131 15082
Note: This table displays the results of OLS- and IV-regressions of the diﬀerence in monthly wages on the
assimilation index. The counterfactual wages for Mexico are based on a Mincer equation, as explained in Section
3.3.1. In Panel A), the unit of observation is a CONSPUMA, while in Panel B), the unit of observation is an
individual. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000 replications, with the exception of those
in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard errors in Panel B have been computed
with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
deviation in the wage diﬀerence.
While in Column (1) every CONSPUMA receives equal weight regardless of the size of the
Mexican community, in Column (2) we weight the regression with the number of Mexicans in
a CONSPUMA, giving higher weight to areas with a larger Mexican community. The estimate
in this speciﬁcation is larger and more precise, indicating that the eﬀect is more pronounced in
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larger Mexican communities. In Column (3) we directly control for a fourth-order polynomial
in the number of Mexicans. In this case, the point estimate is slightly smaller and less precisely
estimated. It is statistically signiﬁcant with bootstrapped standard errors, but insigniﬁcant
when we use conventional standard errors. In sum, accounting for size, either through weighting
or through controls, does not change the estimates dramatically.
In Columns (4)-(6), we estimate the same speciﬁcations as in Columns (1)-(3), but instru-
ment for the assimilation index with the share of Braceros in a CONSPUMA. As shown in
Figure 5, there is a strong negative ﬁrst-stage relationship between the share of Braceros and
the assimilation index. In the unweighted regression in Column (4), the instrument is strong
enough to rule out a weak instrument problem. Once we weight the regression by the size of
the Mexican community, the instrument is weaker (F=7.35) and the estimates are less precise,
although the magnitude of the point estimate remains in a similar range as the OLS estimates.
In column (6), however, the instrument weakens (F=2.49), resulting in an imprecise estimate
that is lower than all other estimates reported in this row.
The aggregate results conﬁrm our hypothesis that a more integrated network leads to better
outcomes for migrants. We now turn to the estimation of Equation (10) with individual-level
data. This enables us to control for more observable characteristics, and gives greater weight to
areas with a large number of recent immigrants. Panel B in Table 2 displays the estimates for β
based on individual-level regressions as outlined in Equation (10). Columns (1)-(3) present the
results without controls for network size. All regressions include individual-level controls, as well
as a control for the average wage of US natives in a CONSPUMA. As before, we report both
conventional and bootstrapped standard errors, which are both clustered at the CONSPUMA-
level.
The result from an OLS regression in Column (1) is similar in magnitude to the estimates
at the aggregate level. An increase in the assimilation index by one point is associated with a
5 USD increase in the monthly wage diﬀerence. In Column (2), we instrument the assimilation
index with the share of Braceros. Again, the ﬁrst stage is negative and suﬃciently strong, with
an F-statistic of 13.9. The point estimate is slightly larger than the OLS coeﬃcient.
One problem with the census data is that around one quarter of the sample have zero wages
in the US. So far, we have taken a wage of zero at face value, but we cannot be sure whether
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the person actually earns zero, or whether his wage was coded as zero and is actually unknown.
To assess whether the estimates are aﬀected by zero wages, we re-estimate the IV-estimation,
dropping all observations with zero income. As shown in Column (3), the zero wages do not
signiﬁcantly aﬀect the results.
In Columns (4)-(6), we estimate the same speciﬁcations, but in addition control for a fourth-
order polynomial in the number of Mexicans in a CONSPUMA. The ﬁrst stage now becomes
weaker and the point estimates are higher. However, the diﬀerence in point estimates between
Columns (3) and (6) and Columns (2) and (5) are statistically insigniﬁcant.
In sum, these estimates suggest that a one-point increase in the assimilation index increases
the wage diﬀerence by 5-9 USD. These results show that the quality of pre-existing networks
has a signiﬁcant impact on the success of migrants. Moving from the 25th percentile of the
assimilation index to the 75th percentile, or going from Waco, TX, to Amarillo, TX, results in
an increase in the gains from migration by between 100 and 180 USD per month.
5.2 Robustness checks: controlling for characteristics of
Mexicans in 1990
In a next step, we assess the robustness of our results to controls for characteristics of the
Mexican community such as the size, average education, or the employment rate.
In several speciﬁcations, we control for the size of the Mexican community, which helps
us to isolate the impact of the assimilation of a community from the impact of the size itself.
Given the uneven size distribution of Mexican communities across CONSPUMAS, ranging from
zero to over 500,000, we chose to control for the number of Mexicans per CONSPUMA with a
fourth-order polynomial. Higher-order polynomials are more ﬂexible than linear or quadratic
controls, but are also more taxing on the degrees of freedom, which can decrease the precision
of the estimates.
To assess the robustness of the estimates to the functional form of these controls, Colums (1)-
(3) in Table 3 present the estimation results for OLS and IV regressions with varying controls for
the size of the Mexican community, ranging from a linear control to a fourth-order polynomial.
All other control variables are the same as those used in Section 5. With the addition of higher-
order polynomials, going from left to right, the point estimates remain at a similar level. In
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some rows of Table 3 the estimates are larger with linear controls than in speciﬁcations with
a quartic while in others the opposite is true. However, the point estimates within a row are
never statistically diﬀerent from each other. The statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient declines
with the addition of higher-order terms, as does the strength of the excluded instruments in the
ﬁrst stage. Therefore, including a fourth-order polynomial leads to more conservative estimates
compared to including a linear control or a quadratic.
In Columns (4)-(6), we additionally control for several characteristics of the Mexican com-
munity in a given CONSPUMA in 1990, namely the average years of schooling, the share of
women, the share of people who are married and the employment rate. These controls are
potentially important in OLS estimations, because community characteristics other than assim-
ilation may directly aﬀect an immigrants' outcome while being correlated with the assimilation
index.
Once the characteristics are included in the regressions, the point estimates become signif-
icantly larger. In the OLS regressions, this is particularly so when we consider the aggregate
level in Panel A, while the point estimates remain similar in the individual-level OLS regressions
in Panel C. In the IV regressions, the estimates conditional on network controls are considerable
larger than the those without controls. At the same time, the ﬁrst stage of the instrument
becomes weaker and falls below the commonly used threshold of an F-statistic of 10. The weak
instruments can provide one explanation for the increase in coeﬃcients, although this increase
is similar to the one in Panel A, which is not subject to weak instrument bias.
Overall, Table 3 suggests that the overall conclusion that a more assimilated network leads
to better outcomes for newly arrived immigrants holds and is robust to the inclusion of commu-
nity controls. The diﬀerence in magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcients between the aggregate-
and individual-level regressions can be explained by the diﬀerent weights CONSPUMAs receive
in each speciﬁcation. In the CONSPUMA-level regressions, each CONSPUMA receives equal
weight whereas in the individual-level regressions, the weight is proportional to the size of the
Mexican community in a CONSPUMA. If, for example, the marginal eﬀect of greater assimi-
lation is larger in smaller communities, this will lead to larger estimates in CONSPUMA-level
regressions. And while not all coeﬃcients in Table 3 are statistically signiﬁcant, most of them
are, and they consistently have a positive sign.
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The fact that the coeﬃcient of the assimilation index remains large and statistically signiﬁ-
cant also highlights that the assimilation index measures the relative diﬀerence in characteristics
between Americans and Mexicans in an area. Control variables such as the average level of edu-
cation or average employment rates of Mexicans may be correlated with the assimilation index,
but the results suggest that there is signiﬁcant variation in the relative diﬀerence between Mex-
icans and Americans.
5.3 Additional results and robustness checks
In addition to the analysis described above, we perform a series of robustness checks, which we
summarize here. Further details and regression outputs can be found in Appendix D.
Results with (log) wages as dependent variable In all speciﬁcations presented
so far, the dependent variable has been the wage diﬀerence between the actual wage in the US and
a counterfactual wage in Mexico, which was predicted based on observable characteristics. This
choice of dependent variable is informed by the theoretical model, which predicts that migrants
with access to more assimilated networks are more likely to do better relative to their situation
in Mexico. The wage diﬀerence approximates this wage diﬀerence between both countries.
However, the fact that the counterfactual wages are predicted potentially creates a redun-
dancy in the econometric model. The reason for this is that the counterfactual wages have
been predicted based on the same observable characteristics Xij that are controlled for in the
individual-level regressions. In fact, if set of variables predicting the counterfactual wage was
completely contained in the set of control variables, the variation in the dependent variable
would only come from US wages. In our case, the prediction is based on several variables that
are not included in the regression  mainly interactions between education dummies and age
 but, nonetheless, much of the variation in the counterfactual wage is absorbed by the control
variables.
In Table 5 in Appendix D, we re-estimate the same models as in Table 2 but use as dependent
variable the level of US wages. In most cases, the point estimates are slightly larger than those
in Table 2 but are in the same ballpark. This small diﬀerence indicates that, indeed, most of
the variation in the dependent variable is due to variation in US wages.
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Table 3: Controlling for network characteristics
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level - OLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 5.540∗∗∗ 5.467∗∗∗ 4.868∗∗∗ 11.171∗∗∗ 11.336∗∗∗ 10.805∗∗∗
(1.574) (1.596) (1.704) (2.851) (2.908) (2.806)
B. CONSPUMA level - IV results
Assimilation index 5.889∗ 5.833 3.555 13.325∗∗ 14.465∗ 15.744
(3.436) (6.402) (50.708) (6.433) (8.232) (51.119)
First stage:
Share Braceros -11.826∗∗∗ -9.148∗∗∗ -2.536 -9.437∗∗∗ -7.389∗∗ -2.293
(3.609) (3.414) (2.466) (3.453) (2.974) (2.202)
F-Statistic 8.70 5.85 2.49 8.36 6.56 2.50
C. individual level - OLS results
Assimilation index 4.592∗∗∗ 4.709∗∗∗ 5.057∗∗∗ 5.558∗∗∗ 5.482∗∗∗ 5.617∗∗∗
(0.950) (1.016) (1.145) (1.385) (1.425) (1.520)
D. individual level - IV results
Assimilation index 6.968∗∗∗ 7.127∗∗∗ 9.082∗∗∗ 13.525 14.612 13.618∗
(2.173) (2.619) (3.378) (13.216) (59.190) (7.603)
First stage:
Share Braceros -9.395∗∗∗ -8.996∗∗ -7.742∗∗ -3.819 -3.292 -4.508∗
(3.613) (3.688) (3.577) (3.557) (2.397) (2.382)
F-Statistic 9.61 8.67 6.59 3.10 3.35 4.29
Network controls (1990)
Nr of Mexicans linear quadratic quartic none linear quartic
Average years of schooling no no no yes yes yes
Share women no no no yes yes yes
Share married no no no yes yes yes
Employment rate no no no yes yes yes
Note: This table displays the estimation results with additional controls for characteristics of the Mexican
community in 1990. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between the US wage and the
counterfactual wage in Mexico. Panels A and B display results at the CONSPUMA-level, while Panels C and D
display results at the individual level. The controls are the same as in the baseline regressions presented in Section
5. Standard errors in Panels A and B have been computed with a standard non-parametric bootstrap with 1000
replications. Standard errors have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance
levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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In Table 6, we estimate the same models as before, but use as dependent variable the log US
wage. The results shown here correspond to those of an augmented Mincer equation. The point
estimates lie between 0.004 and 0.008, which means that a one-point increase in the assimilation
index raises an immigrant's wage in the US by approximately 0.4-0.8%.
Assimilation index based on men only The calculation of the assimilation index
was based on the observable characteristics of both Mexican men and women, whereas the
empirical results shown in Table 2 are based on Mexican men only. It could be the case that the
assimilation of men only as opposed to all Mexicans is the relevant determinant of the success
of migrants. To test for this possibility, we calculate the assimilation index based on Mexican
men only, and otherwise run the same regressions as before. The results, shown in Appendix
D.3, are similar to those based on the assimilation of both.
The impact on women In the main analysis, we exclusively focus on men, mainly because
men typically have higher labor force participation rates as well as inelastic labor supply. In
Appendix D.4, we estimate the eﬀects of network assimilation on the wage diﬀerence of women.
The results are less clear-cut than for men. While we ﬁnd large positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant estimates in the IV regressions, we ﬁnd very small eﬀects once we account for the extensive
margin of labor supply. This suggests that the quality of networks aﬀects women through labor
force participation and employment rather than wages.
Robustness to leaving out large Mexican communities The descriptive statis-
tics in Table 1 show that the size of Mexican communities varies considerably, with many small
and some very large communities. One concern could be that our results are driven by large
Mexican communities. In Appendix D.5, we perform a robustness check in which we drop all
Mexican communities larger than 200,000 from the sample. That way, 1.9% of all CONSPUMAs
with Mexican communities and 19% of all individual-level observations are dropped. The results
are robust to the exclusion of these communities. In the aggregate regressions, we lose statistical
precision, whereas the estimates from individual-level regressions are statistically signiﬁcant and
very similar to the baseline results reported in Table 2.
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6 Conclusion
Migrant communities around the world diﬀer not only in their size but also in their degree
of integration in the host society. In this paper, we study how the integration of existing
migrant communities aﬀects the migration decisions and economic outcomes of future migrants.
Following the literature on social networks, we argue that more integrated networks have a better
knowledge of the labor market in that destination and therefore give more accurate information
to future migrants about job opportunities. We ﬁrst explore this mechanism in a decision model
with imperfect signalling, which predicts that migrants who receive information from better-
integrated networks make fewer errors in their migration decisions.
Using data on recent Mexican immigrants in the US, we test these predictions empirically.
The focus on Mexico allows us to exploit a signiﬁcant variation in the size and social structure
of migrant communities across the United States. We measure the two variables of interest 
the likelihood of making an error and the quality of the migrant network  using the wage
diﬀerence between the US and Mexico and an assimilation index that measures the similarity of
Mexicans and Americans in an area with respect to a large number of observable characteristics.
To overcome omitted variable bias, we instrument the assimilation index with past changes
in the diﬀusion of Mexicans across the US and with past settlement patterns of low-skilled
Mexicans who came to the US during the Bracero program. Our results conﬁrm our hypothesis,
namely that migrants with access to a better-integrated network had a signiﬁcantly larger wage
diﬀerential between the US and Mexico and, hence, were less likely to make an error in their
migration decision.
The central contribution of this paper is its focus on the quality of networks, and its im-
portance for the outcomes of migrants. While most of the previous literature has proxied the
strength of migrant networks through their size, we show, both theoretically and empirically,
that the quality of networks has a sizable impact on the economic outcomes of migrants. It
therefore complements earlier evidence by Massey & Denton (1985) and Hatton & Leigh (2011),
among others, who suggest that immigrant groups, as they assimilate economically and cultur-
ally, become more accepted by the native population.
In addition, the theoretical model and empirical ﬁndings oﬀer new insights for the study
of social networks in general. Most of the empirical literature focuses on the impact of the
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architecture of social networks on individual members of the network. Our paper shows that
the social structure of networks also aﬀects people outside the network  in our case, potential
migrants who still live in the country of origin  through the network's ability to aggregate
information. If more integrated communities have better knowledge and are able to provide
more accurate information, this beneﬁts the recipients of the information.
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A Other datasets
Given the available data on Mexican migration in the US, a researcher faces the trade-oﬀ between
using a large representative dataset with little direct information on networks and without
a longitudinal dimension on the one hand, and small datasets that can oﬀer this additional
dimension yet cannot provide the variation in network characteristics that we would need on the
other. Using the census, we opted for sample size, which we consider as a necessary condition
to say anything about diaspora networks.
Other datasets on Mexicans in the US, unfortunately, are too small for our analysis. The
household surveys ENET (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Trimestral), ENADID (Encuesta Na-
cional de la dinámica demográﬁca), and the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) are conducted
in Mexico, and have little information on Mexicans that already reside in the US. The Mexi-
can Migration Project (MMP), a survey of Mexican migrants that contains both migrants and
non-migrants, has some information on family and friends in the US, and on the help of these
networks in crossing the border and ﬁnding a job. Numerous studies use the MMP to analyze the
eﬀect of networks on migration decisions (Munshi, 2003; Bauer et al., 2005; Amuedo-Dorantes
& Mundra, 2007; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2007; Bauer et al., 2007). The MMP is represen-
tative of migration ﬂows to the US (Massey & Zenteno, 2000), but it is not representative of
the stocks. Additionally, it does not have any information on the characteristics of friends and
family networks in the US, which is what our analysis requires.
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B Data appendix
B.1 Education Groups
For the prediction of the counterfactual wages in Section 3.3 and for the regressions in Section 5
we use four broad education groups. Clustering the workers into broad education groups makes
the interpretation of the estimates easier and allows us to match the Mexican and the US data.
Table 4 shows the education groups for the Mexican and the US census. For the Mexican census
we take the variable years of schooling (YRSCHL). The US census distinguishes between 11
education groups (variable EDUC).
Table 4: Education groups in the Mexican and US census
Nr Education group Mexican census US census
1 High-school dropouts less than 5 years of schooling education group 1
2 Lower secondary education 5-9 years of schooling education groups 2-4
3 Upper secondary education 10-12 years of schooling education groups 5-7
4 Third-level education 13 or more years of schooling education groups 8-11
B.2 Data Cleaning US census
In the US census we exclude the following observations:
• younger than 18 and older than 64 years,
• younger than 18 at the time of immigration,
• if still enrolled in education (SCHOOL=2),
• self-employed people,
• with an annual wage income (INCWAGE) higher than 200,000 USD, as these were clear
outliers,
• living in Hawaii and Alaska,
• if born to American parents in Mexico (CITIZEN=1),
• with unknown income,
• who work less than 7 hours a week (UHRSWORK) or less than 8 weeks a year (WKSWORK1,
not available for 1980), or if any of these is missing,
• if they live in group quarters (hospitals, prisons, etc; GQ=3 or GQ=4)
• if they moved to a district (CONSPUMA) with less than 20 Mexicans.
To make wages comparable between the US and Mexico, we use monthly wages. We ob-
tain monthly wages by dividing the annual wages by 12. Given that not all Mexicans work
throughout the entire year and work full-time, we adjust the income by weeks worked per year
(WKSWORK1) and by hours worked in a typical workweek (UHRSWORK). In the 1980 census,
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we obtain the adjusted monthly income by multiplying the nominal monthly income by 40 (the
full time equivalent) and divide it by the actual hours worked. From 1990 onwards, we also have
information on the average weeks per year, and thus the adjusted income is calculated as
adjusted income = nominal income
52 ∗ 40
weeks worked ∗ hours worked
. (12)
In the ACS, the number of weeks worked comes in six categories, and we use the midpoints
for each category (7; 20; 33; 43.5; 48.5; 51). In some rare cases, the denominator in Equation
(12) is very small  if the person has worked few hours and few weeks  and we drop every
observation that yields an adjusted wage income of more than 15,000 USD per month.
B.3 Mexican census
We use the 10% ﬁles of the Mexican census in 1990, 2000, and 2010 for the estimation of
counterfactual wages. The following observation are excluded:
• younger than 18 and older than 64 years
• more than 100 or less than 10 hours of work per week (HRSWORK1)
• self-employed
Monthly income is taken from the variable INCEARN. As with the US census, we adjust
monthly income by hours of work by multiplying it with 40 and dividing it by the usual hours
of work per week (HRSWORK1). To convert the monthly wage into PPP dollars, we divide the
adjusted wage by a PPP factor (price level Mexico over Price level US) and the exchange rate
(pesos per dollar).23
C Residuals from wage regression
A key assumption underlying the prediction of counterfactual wages is that the error terms are
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). While we cannot directly assess the validity of
this assumption for the population, we can make an assessment based on the residuals of the
regression. Figure 6 displays the distribution of the residuals from the wage regression (Equation
(5)), along with a normal distribution as benchmark. While a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality of
the residuals rejects normality at all conventional signiﬁcance levels, the residuals appear to be
symmetric, with a higher number close to zero than would be predicted by a normal distribution.
We see this as evidence in support of the i.i.d. assumption.
23 The PPP factor is the amount of goods in return for one dollar in the US over the amount of goods in return
for one dollar in Mexico. The PPP factor was 0.48 in 1990, 0.63 in 2000, and 0.68 in 2010. The exchange
rates were 2.83 pesos per dollar in 1990, 9.2845 in 2000, and 12.6287. Sources: Penn World Tables (PPP)
Mexican Central Bank (Exchange Rate).
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Figure 6: Residuals from a Mincer wage regression in Mexico, 2000 census
Note: This graph displays the residuals from a Mincer wage regression on education dummies, age, age squared,
as well as interactions of the education dummies with age and age squared for all Mexicans with a monthly wage
greater than zero. The solid line superimposes a normal distribution.
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D Robustness checks
D.1 Regressions with US wages as dependent variable
Table 5 displays the results from regressions with US wages as dependent variable. As explained
in Section 5.3, using the level of US wages instead of the wage diﬀerence between the US and
Mexico, because Mexican wages have been predicted based on similar characteristics as those
included in the vector of controls in the regression. For an interpretation of the results, please
see Section 5.3.
Table 5: Robustness check: US wages as dependent variable
Dependent variable: monthly wage in the US (in USD)
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 7.001∗∗∗ 7.666∗∗∗ 5.881∗∗∗ 6.009∗∗ 4.879 -3.555
(1.677) (0.953) (1.775) (2.624) (5.457) (34.094)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -16.110∗∗∗ -7.835∗∗∗ -2.536
(4.037) (2.890) (2.466)
F-Statistic 12.53 7.35 2.49
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 5.014∗∗∗ 6.498∗∗∗ 6.044∗∗∗ 5.023∗∗∗ 8.790∗∗∗ 8.529∗∗∗
(0.899) (1.363) (1.222) (1.144) (3.401) (3.020)
First stage:
Share Braceros -14.804∗∗∗ -14.643∗∗∗ -7.742∗∗ -7.683∗∗
(5.402) (5.506) (3.577) (3.607)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 13.94 12.84 6.59 6.08
N 20131 20131 15082 20131 20131 15082
Note: This table displays regression results with US wages as dependent variable. Controls are the same as in
the baseline regressions reported in Section 5. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
While in Table 5 the dependent variable is the US wage in levels, in Table 6 the dependent
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variable is the US wage in logs. Therefore, the underlying regression corresponds to a Mincer
equation augmented by the network variables. For further interpretation, see Section 5.3.
Table 6: Robustness check: log US wages as dependent variable
Dependent variable: log monthly wage in the US (in USD)
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.056)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -16.110∗∗∗ -7.835∗∗∗ -2.536
(4.037) (2.890) (2.466)
F-Statistic 12.53 7.35 2.49
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 0.006∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003 0.019∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002)
First stage:
Share Braceros -14.804∗∗∗ -14.643∗∗∗ -7.742∗∗ -7.683∗∗
(5.402) (5.506) (3.577) (3.607)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 13.94 12.84 6.59 6.08
N 20131 20131 15082 20131 20131 15082
Note: This table displays regression results with log US wages as dependent variable. Controls are the same as
in the baseline regressions reported in Section 5. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D.2 Different definitions of the assimilation index
The assimilation index is a statistical index that measures the similarity between Mexicans and
Americans in an area with respect to several variables. The set of variables includes personal
characteristics such as gender or age as well as variables related to economic well-being, such
as wages or employment. Due to the limited information in the census and the nature of the
index, it does not include variables that would be seen as strong indicators for assimilation in
disciplines other than economics. Examples are English language skills, or the extent to which
Mexicans share American values. Such information makes the construction of a statistical index
more diﬃcult because the index is based on the predictability of a person being Mexican. If
one randomly picks people and one cannot tell based on observable characteristics whether the
person is Mexican or American, this means that both groups are similar. If, on the other hand,
one includes a variable such as English skills, this variable alone predicts very well if someone is
Mexican or American and the index would indicate a low degree of assimilation.
These caveats notwithstanding, we re-calculate the assimilation index and include English
language skills. The results are displayed in Table 7. The estimates in Columns (1)-(3), i.e.
those without controls for the number of Mexicans, are similar to the baseline estimates. Once
we control for the number of Mexicans in Columns (4)-(6), we obtain larger estimates in the IV
regressions, which is most likely due to the weak ﬁrst stage correlation.
In Table 8, we present the results of a further robustness check, whereby the assimilation
index is purely based on personal characteristics while measures of economic well-being such
as wages, employment, or the occupational earnings score, are omitted. The estimates are
similar to the baseline estimates in Table 2. This could either suggest that the variation in the
index is largely driven by personal characteristics, or that within CONSPUMAs, Americans and
Mexicans are as similar in terms of personal characteristics as in terms of variables that indicate
economic well-being.
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Table 7: Robustness check: assimilation index includes English ability
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence US wage - wage in Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 3.604∗∗ 6.509∗∗∗ 1.754 7.733∗∗∗ 10.705∗ 9.345
(1.784) (1.177) (2.554) (2.945) (6.214) (526.427)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -13.423∗∗∗ -5.045∗∗ 0.745
(3.802) (2.241) (2.193)
F-Statistic 9.56 5.07 0.46
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.920∗∗∗ 8.781∗∗∗ 8.163∗∗∗ 4.487∗∗∗ 14.333∗ 13.794∗∗
(0.993) (1.853) (1.604) (1.194) (8.028) (6.225)
First stage:
Share Braceros -10.172∗∗ -10.132∗∗ -3.366 -3.429
(4.259) (4.340) (2.616) (2.641)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 11.23 10.53 4.02 3.82
N 20131 20131 15082 20131 20131 15082
Note: This table displays regression results with log US wages as dependent variable. Controls are the same as
in the baseline regressions reported in Section 5. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 8: Robustness check: assimilation index excludes economic variables
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence US wage - wage in Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.425∗∗∗ 5.767∗∗∗ 3.156 5.299∗∗∗ 5.159 2.638
(1.422) (1.010) (2.139) (2.026) (3.520) (8.067)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -19.309∗∗∗ -10.468∗∗∗ -4.779∗∗
(4.006) (2.964) (2.354)
F-Statistic 18.20 12.47 5.41
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.464∗∗∗ 5.864∗∗∗ 5.482∗∗∗ 4.814∗∗∗ 8.720∗∗ 8.506∗∗∗
(0.808) (1.247) (1.138) (1.162) (3.455) (3.095)
First stage:
Share Braceros -16.852∗∗∗ -16.755∗∗∗ -7.871∗∗∗ -7.877∗∗∗
(5.442) (5.542) (2.811) (2.831)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 18.64 17.18 11.02 10.19
N 20131 20131 15082 20131 20131 15082
Note: This table displays regression results with log US wages as dependent variable. Controls are the same as
in the baseline regressions reported in Section 5. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D.3 Assimilation index for men only
For our main analysis, we calculate the assimilation index based on the similarity of Mexicans
and Americans in an area, with both groups comprising both men and women. But given that
we only look at the impact of network quality on the outcomes of men, it might be that the
assimilation of Mexican men may be more important, especially so because Mexican men have
high labor force participation rates and may pass on job information to male newcomers. To
test whether the assimilation of men is more relevant than that of men and women combined, we
compute the index based on men only, and run the same regressions as before. The correlation
between both indices is very high (ρ = 0.988), but we are not able to compute the index for
nine small CONSPUMAs in which the number of observations is too small to estimate a probit
model. The results, displayed in Table 9 are similar to the baseline results.
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Table 9: Regression results based on assimilation of men only
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.40∗∗ 5.30∗∗∗ 3.67 5.71∗ 6.49∗∗ 7.56
(1.80) (0.89) (2.44) (3.46) (2.96) (13.26)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -19.80∗∗∗ -9.71∗∗∗ -6.68∗∗
(2.37) (3.51) (2.65)
F-Statistic 69.74 7.67 6.37
N 193 193 193 193 193 193
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.14∗∗∗ 5.48∗∗∗ 5.16∗∗∗ 4.35∗∗∗ 7.94∗∗∗ 7.76∗∗∗
(0.76) (1.07) (0.97) (0.93) (2.36) (2.14)
First stage:
Share Braceros -20.67∗∗∗ -20.81∗∗∗ -11.57∗∗∗ -11.60∗∗
(5.44) (5.70) (4.38) (4.57)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 14.47 13.33 6.99 6.43
N 20098 20098 15057 20098 20098 15057
Note: This table displays the results of OLS- and IV-regressions of diﬀerence in monthly wages on the assimilation
index. The assimilation index in this robustness check has been computed for Mexican men only. In Panel A), the
unit of observation is a CONSPUMA. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. In Panel
B), the unit of observation is an individual. All regressions control for the average wage of US natives. Those
in Panel B also include individual-level controls. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D.4 Results for women
In our baseline analysis, we focus on men only, because men's labor supply is typically inelastic,
such that the estimate is not confounded by selection into employment. To complete the picture,
we provide the results for women in Table 10 based on individual-level regressions. While we
ﬁnd fairly large eﬀects on the wage diﬀerence when zero wages are included, the eﬀects diminish
once we only focus on women with non-zero wages. This suggests that for women, networks
mainly work through the extensive margin of the labor market. Women with access to better
networks are more likely to work, be it because they have a higher labor supply, or because they
ﬁnd employment more easily through the network.
Table 10: Eﬀects for women, individual-level regressions
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 3.596∗∗∗ 9.415∗∗∗ 3.062 0.205 9.954∗ 2.344
(0.992) (1.887) (2.300) (0.907) (5.427) (4.770)
First stage:
Share Braceros -14.026∗∗∗ -16.396∗∗ -8.956∗∗ -9.488∗
(4.258) (7.491) (3.711) (5.693)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 9.66 9.66 5.28 4.95
N 14031 14031 5175 14031 14031 5175
Note: This table displays OLS- and IV-regression results at the individual level for recent immigrant women only.
All regressions include individual-level controls, as well as a control for the average wage of US natives. Columns
(4)-(6) also control for a fourth-order polynomial in the number of Mexicans. Bootstrapped standard errors,
clustered at the CONSPUMA-level, with 1000 replications, are displayed in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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D.5 Leave out large CONSPUMAs
As shown in Table 1, the size of Mexican communities varies considerably across CONSPUMAs
from less than 500 to over 500,000. One concern may be that the estimates are driven by
a small number of very large communities. In a robustness check, we drop from the sample
the four largest communities, which have over 200,000 inhabitants and are clear outliers in the
distribution of community sizes. The results, displayed in Table 11, show that the baseline
estimates are not driven by those outliers.
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Table 11: Results when large CONSPUMAs are left out
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 5.071∗∗∗ 4.835∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗ 6.409∗∗ 6.701 8.125
(1.481) (1.149) (1.875) (2.495) (5.019) (10.592)
Weighted by size No Yes No No Yes No
Control: nr of Mexicans No No Yes No No Yes
First stage:
Share Braceros -12.842∗∗∗ -6.225∗∗ -5.299∗∗∗
(2.705) (2.519) (1.716)
F-Statistic 12.07 6.11 6.25
N 198 198 198 198 198 198
B. individual level
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 4.176∗∗∗ 6.426∗∗∗ 5.957∗∗∗ 4.966∗∗∗ 10.333∗∗∗ 10.991∗∗∗
(0.995) (1.801) (1.571) (1.235) (3.682) (3.156)
First stage:
Share Braceros -12.436∗∗∗ -12.578∗∗∗ -7.822∗∗ -7.983∗∗
(4.444) (4.562) (3.247) (3.329)
Control: nr of Mexicans No No No Yes Yes Yes
Exclude if wage US= 0 No No Yes No No Yes
F-Statistic 10.28 9.55 8.19 7.72
N 16142 16142 12165 16142 16142 12165
Note: This table displays the results of OLS- and IV-regressions of diﬀerence in monthly wages on the assimilation
index. CONSPUMAs with more than 200,000 Mexicans have been dropped from the sample. In Panel A), the
unit of observation is a CONSPUMA. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity. In Panel
B), the unit of observation is an individual. Standard errors in Panel A have been bootstrapped with 1000
replications, with the exception of those in Columns (2) and (5), which are heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard
errors in Panel B have been computed with a block bootstrap with 1000 replications. Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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E Inference with weak instruments
Among the results displayed in Section 5, several instrumental variable estimations are based
on instrumental variables with a weak ﬁrst stage. Weak instruments pose two problems for
estimation and inference. First, estimates obtained through a two-stage-least-squares (TSLS)
method are biased towards the OLS estimates, mainly due to the unfavorable small sample
properties of TSLS (Staiger & Stock, 1997). Second, the TSLS method under-estimates the
standard errors of the second-stage coeﬃcient of interest, leading to an under-rejection of the
null hypothesis of a zero eﬀect.
To assess the severity of the small sample bias, we apply a limited information maximum
likelihood estimator (LIML), which has more favorable asymptotic properties and is less prone
to bias compared to a TSLS estimator. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 12 display the results for IV
regressions with various controls. It appears that the small sample bias of TSLS is problematic in
the aggregate regressions (Panel A) once we include controls for network characteristics. While
the coeﬃcient is precisely estimated in a regression without network controls, the estimates
become imprecise once the controls are added. The individual-level regressions (Panel B), in
contrast, do not seem prone to small sample bias. The point estimates are similar to those in
Table 2 and the standard errors are, if anything, smaller than in the TSLS estimations, despite
being clustered at the CONSPUMA level.
In Columns (4)-(6) we use a conventional TSLS estimator, but construct 95%-conﬁdence
intervals based on a conditional likelihood ratio (CLR) test (Moreira, 2003), which removes the
downward bias in the estimated standard errors. In the aggregate regressions, the wide 95%-
conﬁdence intervals based on the CLR test point to imprecise estimates. Matters are diﬀerent
when we consider the individual-level regression, where the 95%-conﬁdence intervals are wider
than those around the estimates in Table 2, but all three coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1%-level.
These results warrant some caution for the interpretation of the estimates based on aggregate
regressions. Weak instruments introduce a considerable small sample bias and lead to signiﬁcant
under-rejection when conventional t-tests are used. However, the results in Panel B suggest that
weak instruments are less of a reason for concern in the individual-level regressions. The small
sample bias appears minor and the standard errors  while larger than before  are small
enough for us to conclude that the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant.
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Table 12: IV estimation results with weak instrument corrections
Dependent variable: wage diﬀerence USA - Mexico
A. CONSPUMA level
LIML LIML LIML CLR CLR CLR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Assimilation index 6.286∗∗∗ 3.555 15.744 6.286 3.555 15.744
[1.71, 10.86] [-17.40, 24.52] [-13.80, 45.29] [-3.47, 16.12] [-67.21, 68.42] [-54.30, 118.81]
N 202 202 202 202 202 202
B. individual level
Assimilation index 6.626∗∗∗ 9.082∗∗∗ 13.618∗∗ 6.966∗∗∗ 9.082∗∗∗ 13.618∗∗∗
[4.08, 9.17] [3.57, 14.60] [2.43, 24.80] [4.81, 9.12] [4.83, 13.85] [5.64, 21.60]
N 20,131 20,131 20,131 20,131 20,131 20,131
Network controls (1990)
Nr of Mexicans no quartic quartic no quartic quartic
Average years of schooling no no yes no no yes
Share women no no yes no no yes
Share married no no yes no no yes
Employment rate no no yes no no yes
Note: This table displays estimates based on instrumental variable regressions. Columns (1)-(3) report point estimates and 95%-conﬁdence intervals based on a
LIML estimator. In the individual-level regressions, standard errors are clustered at the CONSMPUMA-level. Columns (4)-(6) report point estimates from a TSLS
estimator and conﬁdence intervals based on a CLR Test (Moreira, 2003). Signiﬁcance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. In Columns (4)-(6), the signiﬁcance
stars refer to the p-values of the CLR test.
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F Counterfactual Wages
For our baseline analysis, we calculate the counterfactual wages of Mexican immigrants in the
U.S.  the wages Mexican migrants would have if they were living in Mexico  based on the full
Mexican census, i.e. based on all Mexicans that have not migrated. There are concerns, though,
that emigrants are a self-selected along many dimensions, such that their actual counterfactual
wages would be diﬀerent from those predicted based on the entire Mexican census.
As an alternative, we propose to predict counterfactual wages based on a subsample of the
population that is as similar as possible to the migrants. To ﬁnd a more similar comparison
group, we use two approaches: ﬁrst, based on a wide range of observable characteristics, we per-
form a propensity score matching that provides us with a sample of Mexicans that are currently
living in Mexico and have the same characteristics as Mexicans in the US. Second, we use a sam-
ple of internal migrants, which are presumably more similar to international migrants compared
to people who stay in their local area. Moreover, to account for selection into employment, we
predict wages based on a Heckman two-step selection model.
Table 13 shows the correlation coeﬃcients for the counterfactual wages on the entire sample
of Mexicans in the US. The correlation coeﬃcients are remarkably large, which gives us conﬁ-
dence that the straightforward prediction of Mexican wages does not suﬀer from severe selection
bias.
Table 13: Counterfactual Wages: Correlations
2000
Baseline PSM Internal Heck
Baseline 1
PSM 0.98 1
Internal 0.90 0.92 1
Heckman 0.95 0.94 0.80 1
Note: The table displays the correlations between diﬀerent predictions of counterfactual wages of Mexicans in
the US.
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